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ABSTRACT 
Previous studies have shown that many users do not use effective 
data deletion techniques upon sale or surrender of storage devices. 
A logical assumption is that many users are still confused 
concerning proper sanitization techniques of devices upon 
surrender.  This paper strives to measure this assumption through 
a buyback study with a survey component. We recorded 
participants’ thoughts and beliefs concerning deletion, as well as 
general demographic information, in relation to actual deletion 
effectiveness on USB thumb drives.  Thumb drives were chosen 
for this study due to their relative low cost, ease of use, and 
ubiquity.  In addition, we also bought used thumb drives from 
eBay and Amazon Marketplace to use as a comparison to the 
wider world.  
We found that there is no statistically significant difference 
between buyback and market drives in terms of deletion methods 
nor presence of sensitive data, and thus our study may be 
predictive of the perceptions of the market sellers.  In our 
combined data sets, we found over 60% of the drives tested still 
had recoverable sensitive data, and in the buyback group, we 
found no correlation between users’ perceived versus actual 
effectiveness of deletion methods.  Our results suggest the 
security community may need to take a different approach to 
increase the usability, availability, and/or necessity of strong 
deletion methods. 
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
D.4.2 [Storage Management]: Secondary storage, D.4.6 
[Security and Protection],  H.1.2 [User/Machine Systems]: 
Human factors 
General Terms 
Human Factors, Security 
Keywords 
Storage forensics, secure deletion, thumb drives 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Personal electronic privacy is increasingly important, and one 
area of privacy is in the deletion of data on personal storage 
devices. It is common knowledge in the file systems and storage 
community that files merely deleted with the delete key or 
emptied from the trash/recycle bin may be recovered with 
forensics tools or “undelete” programs.  This is because typical 
file deletion only updates the file’s metadata (e.g., pointers to the 
data) for bookkeeping purposes, while often leaving the file data 
intact.  Even formatting the file system with the default “quick” 
option does not ensure secure deletion.  For example, the MSDOS 
format command has been shown to only overwrite 0.1% of the 
data [11].  As a consequence, data thought to have been erased 
may still be retrieved from a wide array of decommissioned 
storage devices, including hard drives [11, 42] and USB storage 
devices like thumb drives [21].  
In addition, the growing availability of mobile computing and 
storage devices encourages sensitive data to be portably stored. 
For example, an employee can carry a laptop that holds thousands 
of Social Security numbers, medical histories, and other 
confidential information.  According to a Cisco survey [5], almost 
one in four employees said they carry corporate data on portable 
storage devices outside the office. 
One answer to this problem is secure deletion, which is 
concerned with rendering a file’s removed content and metadata 
(e.g., information such as a file’s name, size, and owner) 
irrecoverable. Guidelines have been posted on proper sanitization 
of electronic storage [14, 15, 26, 40], and many business and 
organizational policies require data to be erased from storage once 
it is no longer needed [16, 13, 35, 10].  Also, many free secure 
deletion tools have been made widely available to the public.  
With all of the guidelines, information, and tools available 
concerning the sanitization of storage media, many users still do 
not use effective secure deletion methods to sanitize storage 
devices.  A popular assumption is that many users are confused or 
unknowledgeable concerning best practices of sanitization of data 
from their devices upon surrender.  Is this really true?  To test this 
assumption, we ask the following questions in this study: 
1. Do users that have more potentially-sensitive data on their 
device use better deletion methods? 
2. Does any correlation exist between users’ perceived versus 
actual effectiveness of deletion?  In other words, do users 
that use weak deletion methods understand that the method is 
weak, and vice-versa? 
3. What types of potentially-sensitive data do users fail to 
delete? 
4. Do the answers to the above questions differ across general 
demographics information, such as age, gender, and 
profession/field of study? 
We chose to conduct our study using USB thumb drives.  
Even though their raw numbers may be declining due to more 
readily-available cloud storage, they are still very common due to 
their ease of use, ease of sharing, and situations where transferring 
data over a network may be impractical or too slow.  Used thumb 
drives are also readily sold over the Internet at a comparably 
cheaper cost than hard drives or solid state storage drives.  Even 
though they may store sensitive data, thumb drives are often 
treated in a less-secure manner than hard drives (e.g., left on a 
desk in plain sight, allowed to travel outside organizations with 
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the user, or lost [1, 27]).  In short, thumb drives are an often 
overlooked, yet fruitful, target for those interested in identify theft 
[28] or gaining other sensitive information such as trade secrets.   
To measure users’ perceived effectiveness of deletion, as well 
as other beliefs concerning deletion, we conducted a buyback 
study in which we asked participants to trade an old thumb drive 
for a new 8GB USB 3.0 thumb drive while answering questions to 
a short survey.  Our study collected and analyzed 140 participant 
drives.  No identifying information about the participants was 
recorded, and the study was approved through our institution 
through IRB #14-0240.  In addition, we did not answer 
participants’ questions about if or how they should delete data 
from their drives. 
To supplement our study, we also purchased 120 used thumb 
drives from eBay and Amazon Marketplace (henceforth called 
market drives).  We purchased drives from a wide variety of 
sellers in hopes of increasing drive diversity. 
In both groups of thumb drives, we analyzed the deletion 
method used (if any) and categorized the types of potentially-
sensitive data found on the drives through inspecting what files 
are available upon plugging in the drive without any special tools, 
and by using forensic tools to recover any data deleted in an 
insecure manner.   
The rest of the paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 
discusses related work.  Section 3 gives background on thumb 
drive storage characteristics, deletion methods, and categories of 
sensitive data.  Section 4 introduces our study methodology.  
Section 5 gives study results, special cases, limitations, and 
delimitations.  Section 6 gives discussion and future work, and 
Section 7 concludes. 
2. RELATED WORK 
To the best of our knowledge, our study is the only study that 
measures drive owners’ thoughts and beliefs about deletion and 
deletion effectiveness through human subjects research.  Thus, the 
majority of our results section is novel and focuses on data 
gathered from the buyback participant survey in relation to secure 
deletion methods, beliefs, and effectiveness.  However, other 
studies categorized data found and deletion method from storage 
devices purchased from secondary markets, and we summarize 
their contributions here. 
Garfinkel and Shelat [11] acquired 158 hard drives on the 
secondary market between 2000–2002 .  Forensic tools were used 
to recover files, and the types of files were categorized.  The 
authors found only 12% of their purchased drives were sanitized 
using a strong method that overwrites all hard drive sectors with 
zeros.  They found most drives contained data of some kind, and 
42 drives had possible credit card numbers. 
In 2007, Valli and Woodward [42] investigated 84 hard drives 
originating from large corporations and found that 23 of the drives 
yielded significant exposure of sensitive data.  A number of 
special interest cases are identified in which disks contained 
illicit, personal, and corporate-identifiable information. 
Jones et al. [20] obtained 346 used disks spanning five 
countries over 5 years (2005–2009).  The authors found a 
consistent improvement in the reduction of both commercial and 
personal data found over the study period, with the lowest level 
falling to 30% of drives containing individual data. 
Jones et al. [21] also performed a study in which they 
purchased and analyzed 43 USB storage devices bought from 
auctions, fairs, and eBay.  The study found that 95% of drives 
contained data that could easily be recovered, 4% of the drives 
had been effectively sanitized, and 49% of the readable drives had 
been deleted or formatted, but still contained recoverable data.     
In 2011, Sansurooah and Szewczyk [34] acquired, forensically 
imaged, and analyzed 80 used USB storage devices from eBay 
Australia.  They found 87% of drives did or contained attempts to 
delete data, and, out of those, 4% of drives were completely 
sanitized of all data.  95% of the drives contained recoverable 
data, and 13% of drives showed no evidence of any deletion 
attempts. 
Table 1 illustrates key differences between each study.  Note 
that data classifications are often ambiguous (e.g. what exactly 
constitutes personal data?) and cannot be directly compared 
across studies. 
Table 1. Comparison of related work. 
Study Storage 
device 
Deletion 
methods 
identified 
Data classifications Human 
subjects 
study 
[11] Hard 
drives 
Some* File types, CCNs, mail 
headers 
No 
[42] Hard 
drives 
Some* Personal, commercial, 
illicit 
No 
[20] Hard 
drives 
Some* Individual, 
commercial, illicit 
No 
[21] Thumb 
drives+  
Some* Individual, 
commercial 
No 
[34] Thumb 
drives+ 
Some* Individual, 
commercial, file types 
No 
This 
study 
Thumb 
drives 
Full** Personally-
identifiable, corporate 
commercial, corporate 
confidential, illicit 
Yes 
+ Study uses term “USB Storage”, but thumb drives are inferred 
* Does not measure all possible deletion methods described in Section 3.2 
** Measures all possible deletion methods described in Section 3.2 
3. THUMB DRIVES AND DELETION 
TECHNIQUES  
Even though both are common storage devices, thumb drives 
are fundamentally different from hard drives.  This section gives a 
brief background on thumb drives, discusses four deletion 
methods we categorized in our study, and introduces the 
categories of potentially-sensitive data we searched for on the 
drives.   
3.1 USB Thumb Drive Background 
The drives collected in our research were all USB thumb 
drives consisting of a USB connector, one or more NAND flash 
chips (typically in a TSOP48 package), and a microcontroller 
device to coordinate access to the NAND flash storage. 
The NAND flash chip is a type of memory storage.  In 
addition to reads and writes, it also accepts erase requests at the 
raw level.  However, only the typical read/write hard drive 
interface is exported to the operating system. 
NAND flash must implement specialized remapping and wear-
leveling algorithms due to its physical characteristics: (1) In-place 
updates are generally not allowed—once a location is written, the 
location must be erased before it can be written again; (2) NAND 
reads and writes occur to smaller flash pages, but erasures are 
performed on larger  flash blocks consisting of contiguous pages; 
thus, before a written page can be written again, the flash block 
containing this page must be erased, and other in-use pages in the 
same flash block need to be copied elsewhere; and (3) each 
storage location can be erased only 10K-1M times [7].   
3 
 
These physical challenges are commonly solved through the 
addition of a flash translation layer (FTL).  The FTL sits atop the 
raw NAND flash interface, typically in the hardware.  For 
backward compatibility, the FTL exports the hard drive interface 
that accepts only read and write requests; thus, the flash blocks 
cannot be erased directly1.  As a common optimization to mask 
slow writes and erases, when flash receives a request to overwrite 
a flash page, the FTL remaps the write to a pre-erased flash page, 
stamps the page with a version number, and marks the old page as 
invalid2 to be cleaned later during the garbage collection cycle.  
These invalid pages are not accessible to components above the 
block layer, but can be recovered by forensic techniques [4].  To 
prolong the lifespan of the flash, wear-leveling techniques are 
often used to spread the number of erasures evenly across all 
storage locations. 
We investigate data which may be retrieved through the 
microcontroller interface and high-level software forensics tools.  
In other words, the threat model for this research concerns an 
attacker using software tools only. Specialized hardware forensic 
attacks that look at the raw NAND flash chip [4] are beyond the 
scope of this work and are future work.   
Most thumb drives come pre-installed with a variant of the 
FAT file system [25].   If a drive was found to have an intact non-
FAT file system, that drive was excluded from our analysis.  
Drives were also excluded if files were not in the English 
language or the drives did not work.  Analyzing drives formatted 
in other file systems or with files in non-English languages is 
future work.  We also attempted to purchase drives of size 8GB or 
smaller to speed analysis of data on the drives.  The breakdown of 
drives excluded from our study is as follows.  See Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Breakdown of drives eliminated from the study. 
 Buyback 
Drives 
Market 
Drives 
Initial total 140 120 
Exclusion: non-FAT file system 4 1 
Exclusion: non-English language 4 0 
Exclusion: did not work 6 2 
Final study totals 126 117 
 
3.2 Deletion Methods 
We focus our study on the deletion actions taken before the 
drive is sold or traded.  Thus, if the drive shows evidence of past 
file deletions, but not all files have been deleted, we categorize the 
drive as not having been deleted.  Similarly, we do not attempt to 
determine the amount of times in the past a drive has been 
formatted if it currently contains a live file system.   
In order to determine the method used for deletion, binary 
images of flash memory were inspected using a popular binary file 
editor called hexedit [17].  We categorized the drives in the 
following ways: 
• Not deleted (none): The drive contains files readable by the 
operating system when plugged into a computer.  Any 
computer user could see these files without any special tools. 
                                                                
1 The TRIM command [36] is implemented to optimize 
performance and is not guaranteed to erase pages/blocks [22]. 
2  Flash overwrites might be allowed for some special cases, such 
as marking a page invalid. 
• Normal delete: The drive does not contain readable files 
when plugged into a computer, but the drive shows evidence 
of deleted files that were deleted by 1) emptying a trash can, 
2) selecting the file and pressing the “delete” key, or 3) using 
a command line delete or remove command standard to the 
operating system (such as Linux rm or Windows del).  This 
type of deletion is evident in the binary image by observing 
that the first byte of a file or directory’s name in a directory 
entry has been changed to the special hex number ‘E5’.  Files 
deleted using a normal delete may be recoverable using high-
level software forensics tools. 
• Quick format: The drive shows evidence of a quick format, 
which can be performed in Windows by using the format 
command with the /q flag or by right-clicking on the drive 
and selecting format with the “quick format” option checked.  
In Linux, a quick format can be performed with the 
mkdosfs command, and in Mac OSX by using the Disk 
Utility with the defaults enabled.  A quick format can be 
identified by the absence (or zeroing) of the file allocation 
table, which is an indexing structure in the FAT file system. 
The user has performed a quick format if the file allocation 
table is zeroed but old entries exist in the FAT file system 
data section.  Files deleted using a quick format may be 
recoverable with high-level software forensic tools. 
• Full format: A full format had occurred when the FAT file 
system data and file allocation tables have been overwritten 
by zeros, and a clean FAT file system is present.  A full 
format may be performed in Windows by using the format 
command without the /q flag or by right-clicking on the 
drive and selecting format with the “quick format” option 
unchecked.  Files deleted using full format are not 
recoverable with high-level software forensics tools.     
• Other: Methods that did not fall into the previously 
discussed categories were classified as other. This category 
includes methods such as overwriting the drive with random 
characters or overwriting with single/alternating characters3.  
No readable file system is present.  Files deleted using other 
methods are not recoverable with high-level software 
forensics tools. 
3.3 Categories of Data 
Files on each thumb drive were classified according to four types 
of potentially-sensitive data.  We expand the definitions of Valli 
and Woodward [42] to include four categories discussed below: 
• Personally Identifiable Information (PII): We used the 
standard set by the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology [24], which includes full names, addresses, 
SSNs, IDs, credit card numbers, and faces. 
• Corporate Commercial (CComm): Any piece of information 
about a company or organization that could, but not 
necessarily, be made publicly available, such as advertising, 
product manuals, and product specifications. 
• Corporate Confidential (CConf): Any piece of information 
that originated from a company or organization that which 
                                                                
3 Encrypted devices may appear random [39] and therefore 
indistinguishable from a random overwrite.  Thus, we are not 
able to definitively tell if these devices are encrypted or 
randomly overwritten.  Either way, no data is recovered. 
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the company or organization would not want publicly 
available or could be illegal to release. This includes lists of 
customers/employees that contained PII, trade secrets, and/or 
sales/marketing plans.   
• Illicit: Anything that is pornographic or illegal in nature.  By 
illegal in nature, we mean data that could serve as evidence 
of potential crimes.   
On occasion some pieces of data found fell into two or more 
categories. We counted these cases in every category applicable. 
It was beyond the scope of the research to determine if music, 
movies, and TV shows were downloaded legally or illegally; thus, 
we did not include those file types in our potentially-sensitive 
categorizations.  More discussion on this topic can be found in 
Section 6. 
4. METHODOLOGY 
This section is partitioned into three subsections.  The first 
subsection gives background on how the market drives were 
obtained.  The second subsection discusses the content of the 
survey presented to participants in the thumb drive buyback 
program, and the third subsection gives details on the procedures 
used in processing and categorizing all thumb drives. 
4.1 Market Drives 
We purchased 87 used thumb drives from eBay and 33 used 
thumb drives from Amazon.  In both market purchases, our 
primary differentiating factor was cost (cheapness) and small size 
of drive (mostly under 8GB).   
The eBay thumb drives were purchased between May and 
June of 2014 in mostly small lots of 1–2 drives per purchase.  
Three purchases were made in lot sizes of 8–10, but the lots 
showed diversity in thumb drive brands and sizes.   
The Amazon thumb drives were purchased between March 
and May of 2014.  The majority of thumb drives were single 
purchases from multiple sellers, with the largest lot group from a 
single seller being of size three. 
4.2 Buyback Survey  
We recruited participants for the buyback study through flyer 
distribution on a university campus and email advertisements to 
university students and employees.  The study was conducted 
inside a large Midwestern university and was open to participants 
in and outside the university aged 18 or over.   
No directly personal identifiable data was collected or used as 
an identifier.  Instead, an alphanumeric identifier was assigned to 
all collected thumb drives and surveys.  Any incidental data found 
on thumb drives that could possibly identify a participant was 
kept on a restricted university data server accessible only from 
researcher computers connected via IPsec, and the thumb drives 
themselves were kept in a locked university room.  After 
expiration of the IRB, all thumb drive data images will be 
securely deleted, and all participant thumb drives will be 
physically destroyed.  All researchers and survey administrators 
have completed a CITI class for training in human subjects 
research prior to starting this research [6].  In addition, no 
deception was used in our advertising or recruitment materials. 
Our survey consent form states: “This study involves research in 
order to determine user habits and expectations of data deletion as 
well as if data remains on USB drives despite user efforts to 
remove data.”   
All buyback survey administrators were instructed to not 
provide answers to any types of the following questions 
concerning: 
• If the participant needs to erase his or her drive. 
• How the participant should erase his or her drive. 
This was done to best emulate the actions taken by users that 
sell or trade their used thumb drives through other means (such as 
eBay or Amazon).   
We recognize this study is not a perfect mirror of users selling 
or trading used thumb drives through the market, as participants 
may be more inclined to trust a university-sanctioned study. 
The actual buyback survey asked a number of questions to 
determine users’ thoughts and beliefs about deletion (see 
Appendix).  Not all questions were used in this paper. 
4.3 Drive Analysis Process 
All drives obtained from the buyback and the market groups 
were processed in the same way, and the buyback survey 
identifiers are tied to individual drives. 
The basic drive analysis phase can be broken down into five 
steps: 
1. Record metadata identifying the drive, 
2. Create safe and working images for analysis, 
3. Classify deletion technique,  
4. Classify non-deleted data, and 
5. Classify data found with forensics tools. 
Each phase is detailed in the following subsections. After each 
phase, resulting data found was recorded to a database containing 
results with no personal identifiers.  The analysis was performed 
on Linux Debian 7 workstations. 
Step 1) Identify drive metadata: The basic characteristics, 
such as manufacturer, model, identifying marks, and size of the 
flash drives were identified using the Linux commands ‘fdisk 
-l’ and ‘lsusb’. To assist with cataloging, a photo of each USB 
flash drive was taken. The information, along with the drive’s 
unique alphanumeric identifier, was entered into a wiki and 
database for tracking.  
Step 2) Create safe and working drive images: Two 
unmodified binary level copies of the drive were taken: a safe 
copy to be stored in a separate location and a working copy.  The 
safe copy exists to preserve the state of the drive as we received it 
and was created using the Linux dd command. We then copied 
the safe copy image into a working copy image for which all 
future forensics analysis steps was applied. 
Step 3) Classify deletion techniques: We mount the image as 
a type ‘vfat’ file system and search for any visible files and 
directories.  If any files or directories were available, we classified 
the drive as not deleted (see Section 3.2) and skip to the next step 
(classify non-deleted data). 
However, if no files or directories are visible, the user has 
likely deployed some sort of deletion technique.  We then use the 
method described in Section 3.2 to classify the deletion method as 
a normal deletion, quick format, full format, or other.   
Through manual analysis of the raw image through the editor 
hexedit, we were able to classify the following deletion 
techniques used (if any): normal (or regular) deletion, quick 
format deletion, full format deletion, or other deletion methods. 
We then move to the step 5, classifying data found with forensics 
tools. 
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Step 4) Classify non-deleted data: The working copy image 
of each flash drive was mounted and examined for files visible 
without the use of any forensics tools. Directories were explored 
both via command line to uncover possible hidden files as well as 
through a GUI.  Files found using normal file browsing methods 
were grouped into the four different potentially-sensitive 
categories defined in Section 3.3.  Files were then separated into 
four category-specific directories.  When a file qualified for 
multiple categories, copies of the file were added to additional 
category directories.  The number of bytes found in each category 
were measured with the Linux command ‘du –b –
apparent-size’ on a Debian 7 Linux system to get an exact 
byte count.    
Step 5) Classify data found with forensics tools: Each flash 
drive working image was then analyzed using an open-source 
forensics tool suite [30, 41].  The files returned were then 
classified and sorted into the same groups discussed in Step 4.  It 
is important to note that non-deleted files are also “recovered” 
using the forensic tools, so files discovered in Step 4 are once 
again counted in this step. 
5. RESULTS 
This section is broken into three subsections.  Subsection 5.1 
discusses specific examples of sensitive data we were able to 
recover.  Subsection 5.2 compares measurable attributes between 
the market and buyback drives groups to determine if the buyback 
participants are representative of market sellers.  Finally, 
subsection 5.3 analyzes buyback participants’ thoughts and beliefs 
concerning deletion compared to their actual deletion methods 
across age, gender, and profession/field of study. 
For statistical purposes in subsections 5.2 and 5.3, the four 
drives that were deleted using techniques described as ‘other’ 
were included in the group ‘full format.’  We did this because the 
end result was much the same—a drive with no recoverable data 
using our techniques.  We also used the Pearson’s Chi-squared 
analysis to analyze the relationships among the categorical data.  
We consistently use α = 0.05 as our significance level for 
statistical analysis. 
5.1 Data Recovered 
This subsection illustrates the range of sensitive information 
that can be recovered from second-hand thumb drives from both 
the buyback and market drive groups. 
5.1.1 Buyback Drives 
The buyback drive marked with identifier B092 (2GB 
Sandisk drive) had a large variety of sensitive information 
crossing multiple categories identifying the study participant and 
the participant’s business. The drive included the participant’s 
picture, resume, employment history, family addresses and contact 
information, a 2011 tax return, medical screening information, a 
color copy of the participant’s passport, military discharge 
paperwork, a W-4 2012 form, direct deposit information, a copy 
of a voided check, and lists of names, addresses, phone numbers, 
and birthdays of employees.  The drive also contained 
commercially produced and homemade pornographic videos.  The 
survey connected to this drive indicated the participant deleted 
information via the normal deletion method, is ambivalent about 
deletion (selected “in between” on survey question 5), and 
thought recoverability of the data would be somewhat easy. 
The buyback drive marked with identifier B096 (4GB Sandisk 
drive) had a recoverable passport.  This participant did not delete 
the thumb drive, yet answered that he or she “always care(s)” 
about deletion.  When asked on the survey why the participant did 
not delete, the participant responded “in case I needed it for future 
purposes.”  This example may be illustrative of the implicit trust 
of a university study; however, the study description was clear in 
that the participant’s drive would be traded (not given back) and 
then associated data made anonymous. 
The buyback drive marked with identifier B002 (16GB PNY 
drive) contained a resume, one text file with a Bitcoin wallet 
private key, and Litecoin wallet encryption and private key.  The 
participant used quick format as a deletion method, “often cares” 
about deletion, and thought recoverability of the data would be 
“somewhat easy”.  When asked about deletion method used, the 
participant said “I just transferred my flash drive data onto my 
personal computer.”  This answer implies the participant did not 
understand what was meant by the term deletion. 
5.1.2 Market Drives 
The market drive marked with identifier M081 (1GB Apacer 
drive) contained sensitive information about the internal workings 
of a middle school.  The drive contained middle school teachers’ 
pictures, students’ pictures, and names of administrators, teachers, 
and students.  It also contained school schedules, plans, 
announcements, and internal incident report documents.  This 
drive was deleted using a quick format. 
The market drive marked with identifier M055 (8GB Sandisk 
drive) contained on mount a company payroll spreadsheet with 
personally-identifiable information for multiple employees of the 
company.  The drive also contained invoice information for the 
company, as well as personal photographs and other papers with 
individual names that were not related to the company.  The drive 
was deleted using normal deletion. 
The market drive marked with identifier M086 (2GB Sandisk 
drive) contained internal documents for a major clothing retailer 
in the United States.  The drive also contained an individual’s tax 
document with the person’s name, address, and social security 
number.  Also present on the drive were personal photos with 
names and addresses of presumable acquaintances of the previous 
owner.  The drive was deleted using normal deletion. 
The market drive marked with identifier M115 (2GB Lexar 
drive) contained a communication from a state office to a 
university in that state requesting funding and recognition for a 
program, as well as several corporate commercial documents 
pertaining to that university.  The drive also contained personal 
information from an executive-level member of the university—
including tax documents, personal photos, and an illicit photo.  
The drive was deleted using normal deletion. 
5.2 Comparisons Between Drive Groups 
Overall, we found that the drives purchased from the 
marketplaces were not different from the buyback drives in terms 
of presence of potentially-sensitive data nor methods of deletion.  
This lead us to reason that the buyback drives would be similar to 
the market drives in other ways that were impossible to discern 
from the buyback drives (i.e. the confidence sellers had in their 
deletion techniques or the demographic information of the 
sellers).  In that, we found no statistically significant patterns to 
discern relationships among deletion practices.  
First, we compared the market drives to the buyback drives in 
terms of method of deletion (see Figure 1) and presence of 
potentially-sensitive data (see Figure 3).  Using chi-squared 
goodness-of-fit analysis, we found the drives not dissimilar to the 
buyback drives; X2 (3, N = 243) = 1.53, p = 0.33. (As a reminder, 
we cannot prove similarity of the drive groups, only that the drive 
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groups are not dissimilar.)  Of interest, over 33% of drives did not 
have any attempt to remove data upon surrender. 
 
Figure 1. Deletion method buy group between buyback and 
market drives as percentages. 
By re-categorizing the deletion methods into methods that 
yield recoverable data (insecure) versus methods that do not 
(secure), we can further see the similarities between drive groups.  
See Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. Deletion effectiveness by group as percentages. 
 
Figure 3. Sensitive data present on market and buyback drives 
as percentages. 
Also, we found no statistically significant differences when we 
compared the market drives to the buyback drives in terms of the 
presence of potentially-sensitive data. X2 (4, N = 243) = 1.82, p = 
0.23 (see Figure 3).   
The percentage of potentially-sensitive data found in the 
market drive group was 65.81%, and the percentage of 
potentially-sensitive data found in the buyback drive group was 
64.29%.  In total, 65.02% of data found in both groups was 
classified as potentially sensitive. 
Because of these results, we feel confident that the drive 
populations may be not dissimilar in other characteristic ways. 
This means the survey data may be predictive of the general 
patterns in people surrendering drives. 
5.3 Buyback Results 
We analyzed the drives to compare the presence of 
potentially-sensitive data with the confidence the participants had 
in the deletion methods used to clean the drives before surrender.  
In that, we found no statistically significant relationship between 
these two variables.  X2 (4, N = 90) = 3.17, p = 0.47. See Figure 4.  
Please note that 36 participants indicated they did not delete any 
data or did not reply to the question—thus, they were removed 
from this analysis. 
This leads us to conclude that there is no statistically 
significant relationship between the presence of sensitive data on 
the drive and the confidence the participant had in removing 
information from the surrendered drive. 
 
Figure 4. Presence of sensitive data by perception                    
of data recoverability. 
We also tested to determine if there was a statistically 
significant relationship between the variables of ‘deletion 
methods’ and ‘confidence of deletion’.  We removed from 
consideration those who either responded ‘did not know’ or failed 
to respond to the question regarding confidence of deletion. As 
with the other categories, we found no statistically significant 
relationship (X2 (12, N = 90) = 7.94, p = 0.21). In fact, we see a 
disturbing uniformity between deletion methods present in all 
confidence categories (see Figure 5).  For instance, we see that 
66.7% of those selecting “Very Hard” used methods in which data 
was recoverable, while in “Very Easy,” we found 12.5% of users 
who did use deletion methods in which data could not be 
recovered. 
 
7 
 
 
Figure 5. Deletion method compared to confidence                  
of deletion as a percentage. 
5.3.1 Gender 
We had n = 1 participant who declined to include their gender, 
and thus was removed from the proceeding analyses.  Of the 
remaining participants, 44 were female and 81 were male. 
We found no statistically significant differences between 
genders with respect to deletion method (X2 (3, N = 125) = 1.37, p 
= 0.29), presence of sensitive data (X2 (1, N = 125) = 0.93, p = 
0.24), nor confidence of deletion (X2 (4, N = 125) = 1.92, p = 
0.25).   
There is a slight preference for women to not delete the drive 
(see Figure 6); however, these values are within the error of the 
test.  Notably, the percentage of men and women that chose the 
‘full format’ (which yields no data) is similar.  
 
Figure 6. Deletion method by gender as percentages. 
We can then re-categorize the deletion methods shown in 
Figure 6 into insecure surrender and secure surrender methods, 
similar to what was defined in Figure 2.  We find similar 
percentages of men and women surrendered drives both securely 
and insecurely.  Further, both men and women tend to use 
insecure methods.  See Figure 7. Similarly, we see slight trends 
for women to have PII contained on their drives (see Figure 8), 
but these are not statistically significant and do not reflect a 
general prevalence of potentially-sensitive data.  X2 (8, N = 125) = 
6.95, p = 0.27. 
 
 
Figure 7. Deletion effectiveness by gender as percentages. 
 
 
Figure 8. Presence of sensitive data by gender as percentages. 
Finally, we see no statistically significant difference in 
confidence of the participants’ deletion methods (see Figure 9). 
 
Figure 9. Confidence of deletion by gender as percentages. 
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This leads us to reason that we cannot discern either the 
method of deletion, the presence of sensitive data, or the 
confidence the participant will have in their deletion methods 
from their gender. 
5.3.2 Age 
To create more even groups in terms of group population 
while maintaining similar age-bands, we combined the groups 
from the survey into the following categories: 18–30, 31–40, 41–
50, and Over 51.   Even with this adjustment, 75/126 = 59.52% of 
the participants identified themselves as 18–30 (see Table 3).  
 
Table 3. Total of participants by age bracket. 
Age Bracket Total 
18 – 30 75 
31 – 40 19 
41 – 50 14 
Over 50 18 
 
 
As in the previous analysis, we found no statistically 
significant differences in age with regard to deletion method, (X2 
(9, N = 126) = 4.03, p = 0.09, see Figure 10), presence of 
sensitive data (X2 (3, N = 126) = 1.31, p = 0.27, see Figure 11) nor 
confidence in deletion methods X2 (12, N = 90) = 3.99, p = 0.09, 
see Figure 12). 
 
 
Figure 10. Deletion method with regard to age as percentages. 
 
Figure 11. Presence of sensitive data by age as percentages. 
 
Figure 12. Confidence of deletion by age as percentages. 
5.3.3 Profession/Field of Study 
As with gender, we compared the deletion methods, presence 
of sensitive data, and confidence in deletion method to the pre-
determined profession/field-of-study categories.  As in the 
previous section, those who either did not respond to this question 
or responded ‘other’ were removed from the analysis.  This 
consisted of n = 4 participants. 
It should be noted that we had a majority of participants who 
self-identified as being in the Science/Engineering category (n = 
60, see Table 4).  We found no statistically significant relationship 
between field of study and deletion method (X2 (9, N = 122) = 
6.10, p = 0.27, see Figure 13), presence of sensitive data (X2 (9, N 
= 122) = 5.16, p = 0.18, see Figure 14) nor confidence of deletion 
X2 (9, N = 126) = 5.27, p = 0.19, see Figure 15). 
 
 
 
Figure 13. Deletion method to profession or field of study. 
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Figure 14. Presence of sensitive data to profession/field of 
study. 
 
Figure 15. Confidence of deletion to profession or field of 
study. 
Table 4. Total of participants by profession/field of study. 
Profession/FoS Total 
Humanities 37 
Arts 9 
Science/Engineering 60 
Business 16 
Other/Did not respond 4 
 
5.4 Limitations and Delimitations 
Due to scarcity of resources, we encountered manpower 
limitations, impacting our ability to parse drives.  This in turn 
affected the number of drives processed.  The singular buyback 
study location, which was physically close to traditionally-STEM 
departments at a university, skewed the participant field of study.  
The buyback study could have been held in different and/or 
multiple locations (such as a mall, public recreation center, 
business environment, etc.), but we chose to hold it in a university 
due to resource constraints.  Also, conducting the survey in a 
Midwestern university narrowed our pool of potential buyback 
participants, as many of the participants were associated with the 
university. 
A delimitation of our study included buying drives from a 
combination of individual drives and lots of drives.  We chose to 
purchase some lots of drives to help minimize the cost of the 
study.  Those lots demonstrated diversity in drive model, size, and 
other advertised attributes.  We also limited our purchase of 
market drives to eBay and Amazon Marketplace; however, other 
avenues to purchase drives may exist.  We also chose to use the 
TestDisk [41] suite of forensics software; however other 
researchers may have chosen to use different open-source or 
commercially-available forensics software. We chose this software 
due to its ease-of-use with the research team. 
6. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK 
The lack of relationship between users’ perception of data 
recovery and method of deletion may arise from any number of 
factors.  We list some possibilities here: 
• Lack of awareness in the need to use strong deletion 
methods. 
• Lack of education concerning the use of strong deletion 
methods. 
• Perceived difficulty in using strong deletion methods. 
One potential mitigation strategy is to better educate the 
public on the use of strong deletion methods, such as full 
formatting or the use of specialized tools such as DBAN.  
However, this strategy hinges on the users’ willingness to learn 
about additional techniques. 
Another strategy is to set strong deletion methods to be the 
default.  One current example of “security by default” is the trend 
of mobile phone operating systems to encrypt the phone storage 
by default [2, 3]. If strong deletion were made the default choice, 
perhaps users would choose strong deletion more often.  One 
example might be setting the full format as the default setting in 
Windows and OSX, as opposed to the quick format option.  Per-
file strong (or secure) deletion is more difficult [38, 37, 9, 43, 31, 
32, 8, 33], and this option would likely require modifications to 
the applicable operating system and storage interface. 
Even though many organizations include policies for 
sanitization of removable storage media like thumb drives, thumb 
drives are often difficult to track.  A work thumb drive could 
easily wind up in an employee’s home or in a lost and found, 
where it may not be properly sanitized upon surrender.  As our 
special cases illustrate, organizations are not immune to this 
problem.  One policy solution is to ban the use of thumb drives all 
together—however, users may not be willing to give up the 
convenience a thumb drive provides, and thus the policy may be 
difficult to enforce. 
Physical destruction could properly sanitize the thumb drive, 
but only if the actual NAND chip itself is destroyed.  Phillips et 
al. [29] discuss interesting ways in which thumb drives can be 
physically destroyed and whether or not data could be recovered 
in those instances.  The downside to physical destruction is that 
the drive may never be used again. 
Another solution could be to modify the thumb drive to allow 
some sort of secure deletion button, slider bar, or reset pin.  
Another technique could be to modify the thumb drive to allow a 
secure erase command, much like hard drives and solid state 
drives [18].  These solutions would allow the thumb drive to 
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remain usable after sanitization, but the solutions must be 
implemented correctly to be of use [43]. 
Finally, users could 1) use software to encrypt data on their 
thumb drives or else 2) use self-encrypting thumb drives [19].  
The first suggestion is less user-friendly, as the software needed to 
decrypt the drive must be installed on every computer.  The 
second suggestion is often more expensive.  Also, if the key is 
ever recovered (e.g. through coercion or a brute-force attack on 
the password used to generate the key), the data on the drive 
would no longer be deleted. 
During sensitive data classification, we found classifying 
movies, TV shows, and music as illicit (illegal) is difficult for a 
number of reasons.  First, laws and regulations regarding 
copyrighted materials vary [12, 23].  Secondly, it becomes 
troublesome to determine if a particular music, TV show, or 
movie file were actually purchased or archived legitimately.  
Sometimes, one can infer by the naming or packaging of a file if it 
likely came from an illegal source, but it is difficult to infer 
illegality beyond reasonable doubt.  Thus, we did not categorize 
copyrighted works as illicit in this research.  Using advanced 
methods to determine legality of media files will be future work. 
Other future work includes expanding the buyback study to 
different pools of participants in different locations, as well as 
using hardware forensics methods to remove the NAND chips 
from the USB drive to read all storage areas on the chip [4]. 
7. CONCLUSION 
To understand the deletion beliefs and practices of people 
surrendering thumb drives in exchange for money or goods, we 
conducted a buyback program with a survey component and 
compared the results to drives obtained through common markets 
such as eBay and Amazon Marketplace.  Of interest, we found: 
• The percentage of buyback and market drives that contain 
potentially-sensitive data in our study to be over 60%. 
• No statistically significant relationship connecting the 
presence of potentially-sensitive data and deletion method. 
• No correlation between users’ perceived versus actual 
effectiveness of deletion in the buyback group 
• Near equal ratios of men and women surrendered drives with 
recoverable data in the buyback group. 
• Used drives in our study contained a variety of sensitive data, 
including employee databases, tax returns, internal corporate 
documents, scanned passports, and illicit photos. 
We found a general state of confusion about the effectiveness 
of deletion methods  Future work must be performed to remedy 
the situation, perhaps by better user education, more default 
secure sanitization policies in operating systems, built-in device 
mechanisms, or some combination of these solutions.   
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APPENDIX 
Below is the survey we gave to our buyback participants.   
1. Did you delete data from your USB thumb drive?     Yes  No  
2. (Only answer if you checked no on question 1.)  If you didn’t delete data from your USB thumb drive, why not? 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
3. (Only answer these questions if you checked yes on question 1.)   
3a. If you deleted your data, please describe the method you used. 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
3b. How easy was it to delete your data? 
 Very Easy       Somewhat Easy  In Between      Somewhat Hard  Very Hard 
3c. Do you think the deleted data is easy or difficult to recover? 
 Easy to Recover  Somewhat Easy    In Between      Somewhat Hard  Hard to Recover 
4. Estimate how many USB thumb drives you own and use. 
Own? __________________   Use?   __________________ 
5. How much do you care about permanently deleting data on USB thumb drives? 
 Never Care  Rarely Care  In Between        Often Care  Always Care 
6. What is the maximum amount of time you would spend trying to delete your data permanently on a USB thumb drive? ________________________ 
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7. Which category best describes your field of study or work from the following: 
 Humanities  Arts  Science/Engineering  Business/Management  Other (Please write):  
8. What is your gender? 
 M            F                Trans*                Fill in _____________     Prefer not to answer  
9. What is your age group? 
 18-24  25-30  31-35  36-40  41-45   46-50   51-55   56-60   61-65   66+   Prefer not to answer 
